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Revisiting the Baltic growth model: From neoliberalism to the 
social investment welfare state
 
 
Sonja Avlijas 
Abstract 
This article shows that the services-oriented growth model in the Baltic 
countries—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—has been underpinned by a 
social investment welfare state. Some scholars have portrayed the region’s 
transition to capitalism as socially ‘disembedded’ and exposed to a more 
zealous form of ‘neoliberalism’ than the one found in Central and Eastern 
Europe. These accounts have called attention to the social costs of such a 
trajectory of capitalist development (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). Others 
have praised the exceptional economic growth in the region, and contrast-
ed its high educational performance and labour force participation to Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, all the while ascribing these successes to the 
sound implementation of the Washington consensus (Aslund, 2013). This 
article provides a more nuanced perspective on the Baltic countries’ ap-
proach to growth in order to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory 
perspectives. To that end, the article reveals higher state investment in 
human capital, higher generosity of labour market policy and greater ex-
pansion of public sector employment in the Baltic states than in Central 
and Eastern Europe. It argues that these social investment oriented policies 
have underpinned these countries’ efforts to transform into knowledge-
intensive service economies. The article supplies a new type of growth 
model to the literature on capitalist diversity in Eastern Europe. It also 
shows that the expansion of a knowledge-intensive service economy can be 
associated with growth of public sector employment, rather than its reduc-
tion.  
 
Keywords: social investment welfare state, growth models, capitalist diversity, 
knowledge economy, Eastern Europe  
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I. Introduction 
Transition from socialism to capitalism in Eastern Eu-
rope was described as a “great economic experiment of 
the 20th century” (Stiglitz, 1999, p.3). Following the 
initial negative impact of transition during the 1990s, 
Eastern European countries have maintained steady and 
high growth rates throughout the 2000s, especially prior 
to the 2008 global economic crisis (Figure 1). Extensive 
economic restructuring and institutional change which 
have taken place in the region have been influenced by 
both international and domestic actors, as well as the 
countries’ specific historical path dependencies.  
These processes have led to the emergence of different 
trajectories of capitalist development. Literature on capi-
talist diversity in Eastern Europe has acknowledged a 
variance between the trajectory of the Baltic countries—
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—on one hand, and Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) —Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia—on the other. As Stockhammer, 
Durand, & List (2016) remind us, CEE countries have 
pursued economic growth by upgrading their industries 
towards higher value manufacturing products via high 
dependence on foreign direct investment (FDI) and inte-
gration with global value chains (see also Nölke & 
Vliegenthart, 2009). Instead, the smaller Baltic countries 
focused on rapid liberalization to attract foreign capital 
into high value service sectors such as banking and real 
estate (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). Both trajectories 
have, however, been characterized by high dependence 
on foreign capital as a key driver of growth. 
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Figure 1. Annual GDP growth  
Source: World Bank. 
The three Baltic countries saw higher GDP growth rates 
than CEE countries during the 2000s, which went up to 
10% annually (Figure 1). They were also more severely 
struck by the global economic crisis and experienced a 
total 20% GDP decline during 2008-2009, due to their 
high exposure to international markets. While this excep-
tionally strong impact of the crisis raised important ques-
tions about the sustainability of the Baltic growth model 
(Bohle & Greskovits, 2012), following an internal deval-
uation and implementation of austerity measures (Som-
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mers & Woolfson, 2014), the region swiftly and recov-
ered to again reach higher growth rates than CEE.
1
  
Figure 2. Employment rates (20-64)  
Source: Eurostat. 
The three Baltic states have also seen much better and 
more dynamic labour market performance than their 
neighbours in CEE. Their employment rates have been 
substantially higher than in most CEE countries,
2
 and 
they generated more new employment during the 2000s 
than all four CEE countries (Figure 2). The Baltic coun-
tries also saw steep declines in their unemployment rates 
                                                 
1 This sudden negative shock impacted the Baltic countries’ standards of living, as 
they also experienced drops in their levels of GDP per capita, albeit only temporarily 
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix).   
2 With the exception of the Czech Republic which has been at a markedly higher level 
of economic development than the rest of Eastern Europe since the onset of transition 
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
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during the 2000s. By 2008, they had dropped to almost 
2%. While the 2008 crisis had a negative impact on the 
three Baltic countries’ labour markets, they swiftly re-
covered the employment figures once they restored 
growth (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). 
Such successful economic and labour market perfor-
mance of the Baltic countries has been hailed by interna-
tional organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. Much of the countries’ eco-
nomic success has been ascribed to their rapid and effec-
tive market liberalization, macroeconomic stability, sim-
plified tax systems as well as the reduction in the size of 
their public sectors (Aslund, 2002, 2013).  
Political economists also emphasized that there was min-
imal state involvement in the functioning of the Baltic 
economies, and they criticized its social cost. Bohle & 
Greskovits (2007, 2012) underlined the countries’ weak 
welfarist contracts and low expenditures on social protec-
tion, while identifying the Baltic trajectory of economic 
reform as ‘disembedded neoliberalism’. According to 
them, the Baltic model of capitalist development has 
been characterized by a zealous pursuit of macroeconom-
ic stability and economic openness, along with the low 
provision of social security.  
This literature has paid less attention to the fact that since 
the onset of transition the Baltic countries, and most no-
tably Estonia, have been transforming into information 
societies and knowledge-intensive economies (Runnel et 
al., 2009). “When Estonia regained its independence 
2017/04 
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from the Soviet Union in 1991, less than half of its popu-
lation had a phone and its only independent link to the 
outside world was a Finnish mobile phone concealed in 
the foreign minister's garden. Two decades later, it is a 
world leader in technology” (“How did Estonia become a 
leader in technology?,” 2013). All three Baltic countries 
also boast of very high levels of tertiary educational at-
tainment (Figure 5) and high employment rates of the 
traditionally disadvantaged groups, especially women 
(Avlijas, 2016). Furthermore, according to the 2015 Pro-
gramme for International Student Assessment (PISA),
3
 
Estonian 15 year olds are ranked third in the world by 
educational attainment, after Singapore and Japan. Near-
ly half of the poorest pupils in Estonia score among the 
top quarter of children across the OECD world, showing 
the country’s high level of educational inclusiveness 
(“Must try harder,” 2016). Finally, knowledge intensive 
service employment in the Baltic countries, and particu-
larly in Estonia, exceeds that found in CEE (Figure 3).
4
  
Despite these trends, scholarship has not accounted for 
the role of the state and public policy in shaping the Bal-
tic transformation towards knowledge-intensive services. 
In an initial attempt to analyze capitalist diversity in 
Eastern Europe, Feldmann (2006) classified Estonia as a 
liberal market economy, without making specific refer-
                                                 
3 Test administered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 
4 The Czech Republic is an exception vis-à-vis Latvia and Lithuania, but the country 
has been at higher levels of economic development than the rest of the region 
throughout transition (Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
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ence to the fact that such economies are considered inter-
nationally competitive in high-end services, information 
and communication technology (ICT) and other sectors 
that rely on radical innovation and changing market con-
ditions (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Bohle & Greskovits 
(2012) mention the Baltic countries’ substantial invest-
ment into education, ICT and reduction of new social 
risks, but do not develop the argument further.  
Figure 3. Employment in knowledge-intensive ser-
vices (% of working age population) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Notes: 1) There is a break in the series in 2008 because Eurostat 
changed its classification of activities from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2.  
2) According to Eurostat, an activity is classified as knowledge in-
tensive if tertiary educated persons employed (according to 
ISCED97, levels 5+6 or ISCED11, levels 5 to 8) represent more than 
33% of the total employment in that activity. 
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In sum, the economic literature assumes that the state has 
played a very marginal role in the Baltic and that the re-
gion’s labour market and educational performance can be 
attributed to the supremacy of the market mechanism. On 
the other hand, by reducing the Baltic growth model to 
‘neoliberalism’, the political economists have failed to 
acknowledge some of the unmistakably positive socio-
economic outcomes in the region and identify govern-
ment policies that can be associated with them. 
By showing that state-driven educational reform and pub-
lic sector employment have played an important role in 
the emergence of the Baltic growth miracle, this article 
underlines that the knowledge-intensive services oriented 
growth model in the region has been underpinned by a 
social investment welfare state. Previous accounts of cap-
italist diversity in the region have been based on the tra-
ditional definition of the welfare state, while the Baltic 
countries have been notorious for their low expenditures 
on passive social welfare programmes. Therefore, earlier 
contributions have overlooked the emergence of the so-
cial investment welfare state which, as defined by Morel 
et al. (2012), focuses on the creation of human capital 
(e.g. provision of education), as well as its mobilization 
(e.g. work-life reconciliation policies) and maintenance 
(e.g. life-long learning). A lot more that a passive disin-
tegration of the welfare state took place in the Baltic, 
argues this article, throwing a new light on the Baltic 
growth model. The article therefore revisits and chal-
lenges comparative political economy contributions 
which have argued that the Baltic countries pursued a 
‘disembedded neoliberal’ development trajectory during 
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their transitions to capitalism (most notably Bohle & 
Greskovits, 2007, 2012). 
The article adheres to the following structure. The next 
section discusses the literature on the changing role of the 
welfare state in the ‘new’ economy. From there, theoreti-
cal insights from advanced capitalist economies are iden-
tified, which are then used to update the existing typolo-
gy of capitalist diversity in Eastern Europe. Existing ac-
counts of capitalist development in the Baltic are also 
reviewed in this section, in order to show that they have 
not yet accounted for this ‘new’ welfare state. Section 3 
presents data on education, training and digital literacy, 
public sector employment and labour market access in 
the Baltic and CEE spanning from the late 1990s (due to 
data availability) up to 2014. The section thus uncovers 
the nature of the social investment welfare state in the 
Baltic and also discusses its resilience in the aftermath of 
the 2008 economic crisis. The final section summarizes 
the article’s contribution and its theoretical and empirical 
implications.  
 
II. Theoretical framework: A ‘new’ welfare state for 
the ‘new’ economy 
The argument put forward in this article is theoretically 
embedded in the literature which focuses on the role of 
the welfare state in the ‘new’ knowledge-intensive ser-
vice economy. The traditional view is that European wel-
fare states have been shrinking and disappearing over the 
past few decades (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Pierson, 
2017/04 
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2006), driven by neoliberalism that reduces the state to 
regulation as the main instrument of economic govern-
ance (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). A number of social 
policy and political economy scholars have, however, 
challenged this perspective (Fougner, 2006; Hemerijck, 
2012; Jenson, 2010; Morel et al., 2012; Perkins et al., 
2004). Instead, they argue that European welfare states 
have been adapting to new economic circumstances and 
new social risks which have emerged in response to the 
changes in demographic, family and labour market struc-
tures, as well as growing fiscal pressures. Given the 
emergence of the ‘new’ ICT-intensive service economy, 
tapping into the knowledge and skills of the workforce 
has been recognized as a key driver of economic growth 
and development across the EU and beyond. These 
changes have led to the emergence of the so-called social 
investment welfare state which has focused on creating 
and enhancing the human capital of the population to 
support the expansion of the knowledge-intensive econ-
omy as a key vehicle of modern era growth (Morel et al., 
2012). In that context, Jensen (2008) argues that educa-
tion should be considered part of the welfare state and 
that its absence from the literature and welfare state 
measurements may be more a matter of convention than 
anything else (p.160). Furthermore, efforts to expand the 
definition of the welfare state beyond social transfers and 
also focus on social services have been rife in the more 
recent literature (e.g. see Schelkle, 2012 for an over-
view). 
The social investment welfare state focuses on the re-
duction of labour market vulnerability of individuals 
through investment in their human capital from early 
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childhood through life rather than via passive social 
insurance of adults. The logic of social investment is to 
subsidize disadvantaged citizens in order to improve 
their marginal productivity, so that they can access 
higher wages and better quality jobs. It is thus very dif-
ferent from a laissez-faire state which focuses on regula-
tion only and on the creation of any jobs, including the 
low wage and low quality ones.  
These insights have also begun to shift scholarly atten-
tion towards the examination of institutional and political 
factors that underpin the expansion of the knowledge- 
and ICT-intensive economy and that can maximize its 
yields (Garritzmann et al., 2017; Häusermann, 2010). 
Nelson & Stephens (2012) have shown that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom about liberalization, substantial 
public sector investment is needed in order to support 
growth of high productivity service jobs. Thelen (2014) 
has also shown that liberalization in some countries, most 
notably in Scandinavia and in the Netherlands, has gone 
hand in hand with social investment policies delivered by 
the state. The argument put forward in this article—that a 
knowledge-intensive services oriented growth model in 
the Baltic has been underpinned by the social investment 
welfare state—therefore builds on the insights from this 
latest generation of comparative political economy re-
search on the trajectories of service liberalization in the 
ICT-intensive growth era (Nelson & Stephens, 2013; 
Thelen, 2014; Wren et al., 2013).  
Such a redefinition of the welfare state has also had 
consequences for how political economy scholars view 
the role of social policies in economic development. 
2017/04 
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Rather than assuming that the role of the welfare state is 
to protect the population from market forces, there has 
been a growing interest in understanding how welfare 
state reforms are used to support countries’ growth tra-
jectories (Hassel & Palier, fcm; Morel et al., 2012). 
Specifically, in the context of de-industrialization of the 
advanced capitalist economies and the concurrent ICT 
revolution, public investment into human capital has 
become a key welfare state input for the knowledge-
intensive growth model. In that context, social invest-
ment can be viewed as a political strategy that trans-
forms the current distributional conflict over cash re-
sources into a future-oriented welfare for all through 
equitable production, mobilization and maintenance of 
human capital. In other words, instead of looking at 
social investment only as a supply side intervention, it 
can also be seen as an alternative perspective on redis-
tribution, or a government strategy for strengthening the 
negotiating position of labour vis-à-vis capital by 
providing them with more education, which then feeds 
into higher productivity, higher wages, better living 
standards and economic growth (Midgley, 1999). 
These insights about the recent transformations of the 
welfare state in advanced capitalist economies have not 
yet been examined in the context of Eastern Europe. 
Instead, political economy scholarship on the region has 
retained the traditional notion of the welfare state. For 
example, Bohle & Greskovits (2012) argue that the rap-
id transformation and liberalization of the Baltic econ-
omies occurred along with little political pressure to 
compensate the losers of transition. They propose that 
the Baltic neoliberal model was feasible because of 
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these countries’ emphasis on identity politics of nation 
building and alienation from the Soviet Union, which 
resulted in high social tolerance for inequality. Accord-
ing to them, the perceived threat of Russia united the 
people politically and made it feasible to impose a high 
economic and social cost on the population. They go on 
to argue that, as a result of this high social tolerance for 
inequality, the Baltic countries were able to focus on 
economic growth only, rather than also on redistribution 
and monetary compensation of the losers of transition. 
The authors contrast this development model to what 
they refer to as ‘embedded neoliberalism’ in CEE coun-
tries—characterized by FDI-led reindustrialization and 
large welfare state expenditures to compensate the los-
ers of these reforms through passive cash transfers, such 
as unemployment benefits and pensions, including early 
retirement schemes (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012).  
Furthermore, scholarship on capitalist diversity in East-
ern Europe has made an explicit separation between so-
cial and educational policies (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; 
Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009; Lendvai, 2009; Martinaitis, 
2010; Vanhuysse, 2006). When it comes to CEE, Nölke 
& Vliegenthart (2009) have pointed out that neither mul-
tinational companies nor governments have invested 
much into the qualifications of their workforce (p. 680). 
Bohle & Greskovits (2012) argue that educational reform 
never took place in CEE due to the scarce resources fol-
lowing pressures of international capital for subsidies, as 
well as EU-imposed tight budgetary constraints. In con-
trast, Martinaitis (2010) shows that the Baltic countries 
have developed general skill regimes during transition, 
2017/04 
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but he does not examine the role of the state in these 
transformations.  
Finally, Vanhuysse (2006) and Cerami & Vanhuysse 
(2009) connect welfare state reforms in CEE to these 
countries’ growth strategies. They show that the welfare 
state restructuring which took place in CEE was part of 
the rational political strategies geared towards stimulat-
ing economic development rather than sheer populism. In 
other words, they argue that CEE governments intention-
ally used welfare payments such as unemployment bene-
fits and pensions to ‘divide and pacify’ the losers of tran-
sition, and thus reduce political instability so that they 
can attract FDI.  
Building on this literature, this article proposes that the 
Baltic governments have had an active, state-led ap-
proach to welfare state reform. However, it has not been 
the one suggested by Bohle & Greskovits (2012) and 
Vanhuysse (2006), according to which these countries’ 
governments exploited ethnic divisions to shift as many 
competencies as possible to the market. Instead, the strat-
egy of welfare state reform in the Baltic has been shifted 
towards social investment, this article argues. The next 
section empirically examines this proposition.  
 
III. Empirical analysis: Social investment in the Baltic 
Statistical data and primary literature sources are used in 
this section to assess whether the Baltic countries have 
established a social investment welfare state during 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 66 
15 
 
transition. To that end, policies and socio-economic 
outcomes that the political economy and social policy 
literatures have associated with social investment are 
examined. Empirical studies have typically focused on 
educational attainment and digital literacy, public sector 
employment and labour market access for the tradition-
ally excluded (see Morel et al., 2012 for an overview). 
While some of the literature has also associated work-
family reconciliation policies such as childcare with the 
social investment state (e.g. Morgan, 2012; Nelson & 
Stephens, 2012), this article does not examine childcare 
policy. Formal childcare provision has not become a 
politically salient topic in Eastern Europe until very 
recently, perhaps due to the institutional legacy that the 
countries inherited from the socialist era, nor has it been 
associated with greater female entry into the labour 
force. For example, Mills et al. (2014) point out that in 
Eastern European countries “the level of childcare us-
age, enrolment and public investment is actually very 
low”, even though some of them have very high female 
employment rates (p.42). The following three sub-
sections therefore present policies on education, training 
and digital literacy that have been implemented in the 
Baltic countries since the onset of transition, and pre-
sents a range of educational and labour market trends 
that can theoretically be associated with these social 
investment oriented policies.  
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3.1 Education, training and digital literacy 
3.1.1 Policies 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 led to 
structural changes in the educational systems of the 
newly independent Baltic states. OECD reviews of na-
tional education policies during the 1990s show that all 
three Baltic countries started the process of vigorous 
and all-encompassing education reforms which shared 
similar concepts and principles (OECD, 2002, p.15). 
The countries differed in terms of the sequence of im-
plementation of educational reforms, but they neverthe-
less shared many similarities. All three also saw unprec-
edented grassroots engagement of educators and drastic 
increases in tertiary educational enrolment numbers 
already during the early stages of transition (OECD, 
2001a, 2001b, 2002). 
Apart from the many legislative changes which served 
to reform the higher education curricula, strengthen the 
research infrastructure and create more flexible degree 
programmes, the Baltic countries’ educational reforms 
were also characterized by strategic thinking about how 
education could strengthen their position in the global 
economy. The Estonian government, most notably, 
launched the Tiger Leap National Programme in 1997 
with the aim to modernize the educational system, and 
create an inclusive learning environment that is more 
suited to the needs of “a knowledge--‐based, information 
technology-intensive economy” (OECD, 2001a, p.54). 
The programme equipped schools with ICT, linked 
them to the internet and offered ICT education and 
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teaching/learning software to teachers.  
Lumiste et al. (2007) also recognize the key role that in-
vestment in ICT has played in the stellar economic per-
formance of Estonia. Runnel et al. (2009) argue that the 
country’s strategic plan to develop into a modern ICT-
intensive service economy has contributed to such per-
formance. The reform of the educational system towards 
a ‘technological revolution’ also had an additional aim to 
revitalize democracy and bring citizens closer to the state 
which was rebranding itself as efficient and modern 
(Runnel et al., 2009). The country also established the 
Estonian Education Forum, a working group in charge of 
producing strategic documents on the country’s future 
education scenarios with the aim to inform education 
policy making (OECD, 2001a, p.54).  
Using a range of indicators to measure skill intensity of 
the educational systems in Eastern Europe,
5
 Martinaitis 
(2010) shows a stronger orientation towards general 
skills in all three Baltic countries than in CEE (p. 89-
91). Within the Varieties of Capitalism analytical 
framework, general skills are those which are 
transferable across firms, and even across sectors. They 
underpin high-end services, ICT and other sectors that 
rely on radical innovation and changing market 
conditions. Martinaitis (2010) also argues that the three 
countries paid much less attention than CEE to the 
development of vocational education and specific skills 
                                                 
5 For example, students at ISCED 5A level as % of youth aged between 18 and 26; 
students (ISCED 5A) enrolled in social science, business and law fields as % of all 
students; % of adults engaged in non-formal education and training, that studied social 
science, business and law. 
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which are geared towards the manufacturing industry 
and are not easily transferable across sectors (p.82-83). 
This further emphasizes the Baltic states’ strategic ori-
entation towards the development of a growth model 
oriented towards knowledge-intensive services instead 
of manufacturing. 
Figure 4. Education expenditures (gen. government) 
Source: Eurostat. 
General government expenditures on education as a share 
of GDP in the three Baltic countries have been signifi-
cantly higher than educational expenditures in CEE, es-
pecially in comparison to the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia (Figure 4). Estonia, in particular, has allocated sub-
stantial public funds to education, reaching up to 7% of 
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GDP in some years. This makes it one of the biggest 
spenders on education in the EU, as well as the OECD.
6
 
Moreover, since the three Baltic countries had exception-
ally high growth rates during the 2000s (Figure 1), their 
nominal allocations towards education would have been 
growing even during the periods which saw dropping 
shares of educational expenditures in GDP. 
Furthermore, Hungary and Poland, who have spent high-
er shares of their GDP on education than the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia, especially during the mid-2000s, 
have not had such a clear vision for educational reform as 
the Baltic states, and their policy was neither entirely 
focused on the strengthening of manufacturing and spe-
cific skills nor on the development of the general ones 
(Martinaitis, 2010).  
 
High expenditures on education in the Baltic states along 
with their overall smaller government size also demon-
strate that educational spending has been a high political 
priority for their governments. In other words, education 
devours a significantly higher share of total public ex-
penditures in the Baltic than in CEE. Overall public rev-
enue/public spending as a share of GDP in 2002 was 
36% in Estonia, and 35% in Latvia and Lithuania, while 
it was 51% and 45% in Hungary and Poland respectively. 
Therefore, expenditures on education which amounted to 
7% of the GDP in Estonia in 2002 constituted 20% of the 
country’s total public expenditures. In contrast, Hungary 
                                                 
6 EU-15 average spending on education is around 5% of GDP.  
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allocated 11% of its total public expenditures to educa-
tion in the same year (see Figure A3 in the Appendix).  
Investment in ICT in the region may have also spurred 
further demand for higher education. Skill-biased tech-
nological change can, in theory, increase the demand for 
higher education. “The shift in production technologies 
causes information technologies to be complementary to 
employees with higher skill levels since it increases the 
returns to schooling” (Galor & Moav, 2000 in Castelló-
Climent & Hidalgo-Cabrillana 2010, p.2). 
EU funds have provided an additional stimulus for social 
investment in Eastern Europe. The EU began to heavily 
shape Eastern European growth models and EU co-
financing became an essential factor for the development 
of the region since the countries became members in 
2004. For the programmatic period 2007-2013, EU funds 
have represented 18.5% of Estonia’s GDP, while they 
have represented 19.4% and 19.6% in Latvia and Lithua-
nia respectively (vs. 16.2% Eastern European average). 
Thus, the Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund and 
Horizon 2020 have played an important role in promot-
ing social investment in the region, both as part of the 
Lisbon Agenda, Europe 2020 and the 2013 Social In-
vestment Package.  
Ever since 1993, member states have been determining 
the types of activities they spend the EU funds on. There-
fore, allocation of funds and their structure reflect the 
countries’ individual growth strategies. In contrast to the 
other Eastern member states, many of the EU funds in 
Estonia have been channelled to the development of the 
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knowledge-intensive economy, such as boosting interna-
tional competitiveness of enterprises through R&D and 
technology development. In Latvia and Lithuania the 
funds have been directed towards training of the unem-
ployed and teachers, as well as increasing knowledge and 
competences of the workforce, thus indicating a strong 
social investment oriented component of the EU projects 
implemented in these countries too (KPMG, 2014). 
Finally, Baltic countries have been allocating around 
20% of their labour market policy expenditures to train-
ing while this category of expenditures has been almost 
non-existent in CEE (see Figure A9 in the Appendix).
7
 
While there was a dip in expenditures on training during 
the period of economic recession, their share has recov-
ered in Estonia and Latvia since, while it has continued to 
lag in Lithuania. Importantly, these expenditures in the 
Baltic have not come at the expense of unemployment 
compensation which guarantees income security to the 
unemployed. In fact, ever since the early 2000s, the Bal-
tic countries have been at least at the level of CEE if not 
higher in terms of unemployment assistance coverage 
and income replacement rates, the standard measures to 
assess the generosity of the unemployment insurance 
system (see Figures A4-6 in the Appendix). This implies 
that a comparatively strong labour market policy has un-
derpinned the Baltic growth model. In addition, Masso & 
Krillo (2011) show that expenditures on both passive and 
                                                 
7 A cross-national comparison of labour market policy expenditures as % of GDP 
would not be very informative, since the Baltic countries have had substantially 
superior labour market performance than CEE throughout the 2000s and therefore less 
unemployed persons to spend on. 
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active measures in the Baltic countries have grown sig-
nificantly since the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, 
also thanks to the use of EU funds which compensated 
for some of the fiscal constraints that the countries faced 
at the time. These observations indicate a strong response 
of labour market policy in the Baltic states to the adverse 
impact that the recession has had on the countries’ labour 
markets.  
3.1.2 Educational attainment and digital literacy 
By the end of post-socialist transition, the Baltic coun-
tries had a substantially higher share of the population 
with tertiary education
8
 than the CEE ones, which have 
been at even higher levels of economic development.
9
 In 
2014, 32.6% of the working age population had tertiary 
education in Estonia in comparison to 19.1% in the 
Czech Republic (Figure 5). Latvia and Lithuania also 
stood out in terms of the higher educational attainment of 
their populations in comparison to CEE. While the earli-
est available Eurostat data on tertiary educational attain-
ment shows that the Baltic countries were at higher levels 
than CEE already in the early 2000s, Terama et al. (2014) 
underline that enrolment in tertiary education in Estonia 
increased by 168% between 1994/95 and 2005/2006, 
                                                 
8 Eurostat groups educational attainment into three categories, following the Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 19978 classification: i) pre-
primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0, 1 and 2); ii) upper second-
ary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4), and iii) first and sec-
ond stage tertiary education (levels 5 and 6).  
9 Measured in terms of GDP per capita and GDP per capita PPP. 
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which constituted the highest growth rate in the OECD 
during that period (p.116). 
Figure 5. Working age population with tertiary edu-
cation  
Source: Eurostat.  
Note: CZ – Czech Republic, EE – Estonia, HU – Hungary, LT – 
Lithuania, LV – Latvia, PL – Poland, SK – Slovakia. 
The cross-national difference in educational attainment 
has been even starker along gender lines. The Baltic 
countries saw the steepest gains in tertiary educational 
attainment among women. By 2014, 40.7% of working 
age women had tertiary education in Estonia in compari-
son to 20.1% in the Czech Republic (Figure 6). There-
fore, expansion of tertiary education in the Baltic has 
primarily benefited women, which is consistent with the 
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literature on social investment in advanced capitalist 
economies (Nelson & Stephens, 2013; Thelen, 2014). 
Figure 6. Working age women with tertiary education  
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: CZ – Czech Republic, EE – Estonia, HU – Hungary, LT – 
Lithuania, LV – Latvia, PL – Poland, SK – Slovakia. 
Finally, quality of education in the Baltic, and particular-
ly in Estonia, has received international recognition. Es-
tonia has become an international leader in educational 
achievement, according to PISA assessments. Based on 
the results of the most recent 2015 PISA, Estonia came 
only after Singapore and Japan in terms of the proficien-
cy of 15-year-old students in science, reading and math-
ematics. It has also become one of the world’s top per-
formers when it comes to the inclusion and fairness of 
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secondary education. More than four in ten Estonian stu-
dents with a disadvantaged background score among the 
top quarter of students in all PISA participating countries 
despite the odds against them (OECD, 2016). Latvia was 
also one of the few countries which saw consistent im-
provements in their PISA scores from 2000, and its per-
formance is at the level of the OECD average, along with 
the more developed economies such as the United States, 
Austria and Sweden. Lithuania, on the other hand, has 
lagged behind the OECD average.   
The level of digital literacy, proxied by internet usage 
skills, in the Baltic is also higher than in CEE, and Lithu-
ania in particular (Figure 7). It has in fact almost reached 
that of Sweden, while it is far above the rest of the EU 
member states. 
According to The Web Index, Estonia is ranked very 
highly in a number of dimensions of the Internet’s con-
tribution to social, economic and political progress in 
countries across the world.
10 For example, in terms of the 
Access and affordability of the Internet component of the 
Index (which includes indicators such as access to inter-
net in schools, cost of broadband per capita income and 
policies promoting free and low cost internet access), 
Estonia ranked third in Europe and Central Asia in 2014, 
right behind Denmark and Finland. While Lithuania and 
                                                 
10 This index is produced by the World Wide Web Foundation and it is the 
world’s first measure of its contribution to social, economic and political pro-
gress at country level. 
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Latvia are not included in this survey,
11
 the Czech Re-
public was in the 17
th
 place, followed by Hungary which 
was in the 18
th
 and Poland in the 22
nd
. In terms of the 
Education and awareness component of the index, Esto-
nia was also ranked third, after Iceland and Denmark, 
while CEE countries lagged substantially.  
Figure 7. Share of individuals aged 16-74 with profi-
cient internet usage skills  
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: These individuals can complete 5 or 6 of the following activi-
ties: used search engine, sent mail with attachment, posted messages 
to chatrooms/newsgroups or online discussion forum, made phone 
calls, done peer-to-peer file sharing or created a web page. 
 
                                                 
11 While this index does not include Lithuania and Latvia, other sources indicate 
that these two countries, although lagging after Estonia, are aspiring European 
leaders in ICT. 
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Estonia also ranked higher than Latvia and Lithuania in 
terms of its educational and ICT infrastructure already 
during the early 2000s, as well as its high-technology 
exports. Latvia appears to have been slightly more ad-
vanced than Lithuania in terms of hi-tech exports, but 
weaker in communication technology and R&D efforts 
(World Bank, 2003, p.8). Lithuania has also continued its 
progress in communication technology, and by 2013 the 
country was ranked 8
th
 in the EU according to usage of 
electronic government services (KPMG, 2014).  
 
3.2 Public sector employment 
 
Figure 8 shows employment trends in the knowledge-
intensive parts of the public sector in the Baltic vs CEE. 
According to the Eurostat classification, knowledge-
intensive public sector activities include the following: i) 
public administration and defence, including compulsory 
social security, ii) education, and iii) health and social 
work.
12
 Public sector employees which work in state 
                                                 
12 Because of the variation in employment rates across the Eastern European countries 
analysed in this article (see The three Baltic countries saw higher GDP 
growth rates than CEE countries during the 2000s, which went up to 
10% annually (Figure 1). They were also more severely struck by 
the global economic crisis and experienced a total 20% GDP decline 
during 2008-2009, due to their high exposure to international mar-
kets. While this exceptionally strong impact of the crisis raised im-
portant questions about the sustainability of the Baltic growth model 
(Bohle & Greskovits, 2012), following an internal devaluation and 
implementation of austerity measures (Sommers & Woolfson, 2014), 
the region swiftly and recovered to again reach higher growth rates 
than CEE.  
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owned public companies are omitted from the analysis, 
also because of the significant variations in company 
privatization levels across Eastern European countries.  
 
Figure 8. Public sector employment (% of working 
age population) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Note: There is a break in the series in 2008 because Eurostat changed 
its classification of activities from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2. 
 
Public employment levels in the Baltic have risen stead-
ily during the 2000s, and by 2008 the region had by far 
the highest share of public sector employment in East-
                                                                                              
Figure 2), employees in the public sector are calculated as a share of the total 
working age population instead of a share in total employment. This is because two 
countries can have identical shares of employees in the public sector out of all em-
ployees, but when the overall employment rate is much lower in one country, that 
indicator hides the fact that a significantly lower portion of working age people work 
in the public sector in that country. 
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ern Europe (Figure 8). This is an unexpected finding, 
given the ‘neoliberal’ narrative offered by the political 
economy literature on Eastern Europe. The 2008 eco-
nomic crisis had an adverse impact on the level of pub-
lic employment in Latvia only, but the trend had recov-
ered by 2010 and continued going upward. The differ-
ences between the Baltic and CEE are even more pro-
nounced for women’s employment, which indicates a 
larger presence of women in the Baltic public sector 
than in CEE (see Figure A7 in the Appendix).  
Figure 9. Employment in education (% of working 
age population) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Notes: 1) There is a break in the series in 2008 because Eurostat 
changed its classification of activities from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2. 2) 
Working age refers to the age cohort (15-64). 
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The education sector in particular has driven the overall 
higher trends in public sector employment in the Baltic. 
Figure 9 shows the share of employment in the education 
sector as a share of total working age population in East-
ern Europe. The share is around 2pp higher in the Baltic 
countries than in CEE by the end of the period of obser-
vation. These trends have also been particularly pro-
nounced for women. Around 10% of all working age 
women worked in the education sector at the end of the 
period of observation in all three Baltic countries (see 
Figure A8 in the Appendix). 
 
3.3 Labour market inclusion 
The Baltic countries have performed better than CEE 
when it comes to labour market inclusion of the tradi-
tionally marginalized groups such as women. Women 
have attained very high levels of employment, especial-
ly the educated ones, which is characteristic of countries 
with high levels of social investment (Nelson & Ste-
phens, 2013). This trend stands in stark contrast to CEE 
countries, which have struggled to effectively incorpo-
rate women into their labour force (Avlijas, 2016). Em-
ployment rates of women aged 20‑64 in 2008 stood at 
72.9% in Estonia, 71.9% in Latvia and 68.7% in Lithu-
ania in comparison to 62.5% in the Czech Republic, 
60.3% in Slovakia and 54.8% in Hungary (Figure 10). 
Following the drop in female employment during the 
2008-09 recession, these rates recovered to almost pre-
crisis levels by 2014.  
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Employment gap between the two genders has also been 
substantially lower in the Baltic than in CEE, standing 
at around 4pp in all three Baltic countries in 2008. The 
gap ranged between 7‑10pp in CEE throughout the peri-
od of observation (Figure 11). The 2008 crisis had a 
“positive effect” on the gender gap in employment rates 
in the Baltic, which disappeared entirely, predominantly 
because of a greater loss of male jobs in the region. As 
the male jobs recovered, the gaps almost returned to 
their (still very low) pre-crisis levels by 2014. These 
data indicate that women in the Baltic countries have 
had much more equal access to the labour market than 
women in CEE, both before and after the 2008 econom-
ic crisis. 
Figure 10. Female employment rates (20-64) 
Source: Eurostat.  
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Figure 11. Gender gap in employment rates (20-64)  
Source: Eurostat.  
Employment rates of youth, defined by Eurostat as 
those aged 20-29, have been substantially higher in Es-
tonia and Latvia than in other Eastern European coun-
tries throughout the 2000s. They rose steadily in the two 
countries to reach around 70% in 2008, while Lithuania 
did not see as much progress on that policy front. While 
the 2008 recession caused a rather substantial drop in 
youth employment in the two leading performers, the 
two countries saw a recovery since 2010, but these rates 
have yet to recover to their pre-crisis levels (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Youth employment rates (20-29) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusions and implications for future research  
This article shows that a social investment welfare state 
in the post-socialist Baltic states has played an active 
role in delivering and shaping the region’s growth mod-
el. The article contributes to the literature on capitalist 
diversity in post-socialist Eastern Europe. It does so by 
revisiting the account by Bohle & Greskovits (2012) 
who criticize the Baltic growth model and argue that it 
has been socially ‘disembedded’ and characterized by 
very low state involvement. The article also revises the 
account that the region’s socio-economic successes can 
be attributed to the sound implementation of the Wash-
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ington Consensus, which has put forward by Aslund 
(2013). It therefore appeases two seemingly contradicto-
ry perspectives on the nature of the Baltic transition to 
capitalism. The article’s findings are also of high politi-
cal salience, because failing to acknowledge the im-
portant role of the state in underpinning economic trans-
formation towards the ‘new’ economy leads us down a 
perilous path of concluding that market on its own can 
bring about superior educational and labour market per-
formance. Finally, the article contributes to the emer-
gent comparative political economy literature on growth 
models and growth strategies of the advanced capitalist 
economies, which emphasizes the importance of under-
standing how countries’ growth trajectories are deter-
mined by specific political opportunities and con-
straints, as well as the specific public policies that un-
derpin them (Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016; Hassel & 
Palier, fcm). 
The empirical section of the article shows that the Baltic 
countries have had higher expenditures on education 
and ICT literacy, higher generosity of labour market 
policies, higher levels of public employment and better 
labour market inclusion than CEE. The section also un-
covers cross-national variations in the social investment 
welfare states across the region. Estonia is identified as 
the regional leader, Latvia as following closely, while 
Lithuania has lagged substantially in some dimensions 
of the social investment agenda.  
The article also shows that social investment policies in 
the Baltic have been resilient to the impact of the 2008 
economic crisis. While the three countries were severely 
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impacted by the recession, both in terms of their GDP 
decline and employment losses, empirical evidence has 
shown a pro-active labour market policy during the re-
cession, following which their employment rates recov-
ered to almost pre-crisis levels by 2010. The resilience 
of social investment policies during a severe recession 
indicates that they are not auxiliary strategies, but are in 
fact key pillars which support the region’s growth mod-
el. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Economic development, GDP pc PPP 
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
Figure A2. Unemployment rate (% of total pop.) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure A3. Share of education in general government 
expenditures 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure A4. Unemployment assistance coverage rate 
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). 
Note: *Percentage of the labor force insured for unemployment risk.  
Figure A5. Unemployment assistance income re-
placement rate: Single individuals 
 
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). 
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Figure A6. Unemployment insurance income re-
placement rate: Family (100%) 
 
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED). 
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Figure A7. Female public sector employment (% of 
working age women) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Notes: 1) There is a break in the series in 2008 because Eurostat 
changed its classification of activities from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2. 2) 
Working age refers to the age cohort (15-64). 
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Figure A8. Female employment in education (% of 
working age women) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Notes: 1) There is a break in the series in 2008 because Eurostat 
changed its classification of activities from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2. 2) 
Working age refers to the age cohort (15-64). 
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Figure A9. Composition of labour market policy expenditures, 2006-2015 
   
   
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Note: 1) Data are not available for Poland. 2) The author includes the following policies into the job creation category: labour market arbitrage, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives. 
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